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Challenges to Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements




He closed the office door one last time. After about six years of hard
work, he had lost his job as a financial services manager. At sixty-two, he
hoped he would be able to find another good position in the securities
industry. He wondered if he had been fired because of his age. He decided
to fight back, to bring his claim to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), and then to the federal courts. After more than four
years of battling his employer, the United States Supreme Court denied him
access to the courts because of an arbitration clause in his Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) registration form. In Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court determined for the first
time that parties may agree to resolve their statutory employment claims in
arbitration.
1
Although Gilmer signaled the Supreme Court's initial approval of
employment arbitration for age discrimination claims, subsequent federal
court decisions expanded Gilmer to embrace the arbitration of a wide range
of statutory claims, including Title VII actions.2 After Gilmer and these
post-Gilmer federal decisions, some employers raced to insert pre-dispute
Assistant Professor of Law, Bentley College.
1 500 U.S. 20, 23, 26 (1991).
2 See, e.g., Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 32 F.3d 516, 519 (1Ith Cir. 1994)
(race discrimination); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir.
1992) (sexual harassment); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir.
1991) (gender discrimination); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th
Cir. 1991) (gender discrimination); Beauchamp v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 918 F.
Supp. 1091, 1099 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (age and gender discrimination); Maye v. Smith
Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (race discrimination and sexual
harassment); Scher v. Equitable Life Assurance Sc'y, 866 F. Supp. 776, 778-779
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (religion discrimination); Bleumer v. Parkway Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 913,
925-926 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) (whistle-blower claim under Conscientious
Employee Protection Act). See also Christopher S. Miller & Brian D. Poe, Arbitrating
Employment Claims: the State of the Law, 46 LAB. LJ. 195, 195 (1995); Stuart L. Bass,
Recent Court Decisions Epand Role ofArbitration in Harassment and Other 7tle VII Claims,
46 LAB. LJ. 38, 44 (1995); Rick Bales & Reagan Butch, 7he Future of Employment
Arbitration in the Nonunion Sector, 45 LAB. LJ. 627, 627 (1994).
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arbitration clauses into employee handbooks, offer letters, promotion
awards, salary increases and other employment documents, hoping to avoid
litigation costs and procedural and substantive statutory rights and remedies.
Many employees have found themselves forced to sign pre-dispute
arbitration agreements (PDAAs) in order to keep their jobs, to advance their
careers or to obtain raises.3 Concerned about the dangers of coercive
arbitration agreements, legislative remedies were proposed, but those
proposals stalled in Congress.
4
Yet, the widespread judicial approval of employment arbitration and the
stagnation of legislative proposals do not mean that there are no current
limits on the utilization of PDAAs to resolve employment disputes. As with
any other contract, arbitration agreements may be challenged on both legal
and equitable grounds. 5 The focus of recent litigation 6 and administrative
agency actions7 has now shifted from challenging the arbitrability of
3 See David A. Lipton, Mandatory Arbitration: Where It Has Gone and Where It Has to
Go, NIDR F., Summer 1995, at 28-31; Frank Swoboda, Fmployers Find a Tool to End
Workers' Right to Sue: Arbitration, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 18, 1994, at HS.
4 In 1994, Senator Russell Feingold proposed the Protection from Coercive Employment
Agreements Act of 1994 (S. 2012), which would prohibit employers from requiring
employees to agree to arbitration as a condition of employment or job advancement. The
proposed act would also make it unlawful to discriminate against employees who refused to
consent to arbitration. See Hope B. Eastman & David M. Rothenstein, The Fate of Mandatory
Employment Arbitration Amidst Growing Opposition: A Call for Common Ground, 20
EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 595, 601 (1995). In addition, several members of the House of
Representatives proposed the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1994 (H.R. 4981),
which would amend federal civil rights statutes to retain each statute's exclusive powers and
procedures when an employment claim arises. See id. at 602. Under this Act, employees
could only opt for arbitration after a dispute had developed. See id.
5 Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), arbitration agreements are enforceable "save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1982). The FAA merely puts arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other
contracts meaning they can be struck down on recognized legal or equitable grounds.
6 See infra notes 21-59, 68-86, 91-102, 114-120, 122-126 and accompanying text.
7 Both the EEOC and the National Labor Relations Board have raised objections to
compulsory arbitration programs. See Richard C. Reuben, Two Agencies Review Forced
Arbitration, A.B.A. I., Aug. 1995, at 26, 26. Paul Steven Miller, EEOC commissioner and
co-chair of its ADR task force, stated:
We arc very much supportive of fair and credible voluntary programs for resolving
workplace disputes. However, we continue to be opposed to mandatory programs that
make agreement to binding arbitration of employment discrimination claims a
precondition for getting or keeping a job, or that attempt to preclude an individual's
right to have the EEOC process [his or her] charge.
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statutory claims to invalidating arbitration agreements based on common
law contractual and public policy grounds.8 Recent cases have looked at
issues of fundamental fairness in the employee's waiver of the judicial
forum or in the handling of the actual arbitration process. 9 Specifically,
courts have addressed: (1) whether parties knowingly and voluntarily
waived their right to go to court10 and (2) whether the arbitration process
Id. See also infra notes 60-67, 89-90 and accompanying text.
In addition, President Clinton in 1993 convened a ten-member Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations, headed by Former Secretary of Labor John T.
Dunlop (Dunlop Commission). See Eastman & Rothensteln, supra note 4, at 603; Kevin P.
McGowan, Dunlop Commission: Panel Strongly Endorses Use of ADR, But Opposes
Mandatory Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at d4 (Jan. 10, 1995). The Dunlop
Commission heard several hours of testimony on the use of ADR in the workplace. See
Eastman & Rothenstein, supra note 4, at 595. Released in January 1995, the Commission's
report strongly favored the utilization of ADR but also rejected the establishment of
mandatory arbitration programs as a condition of employment. See McGowan, supra, at d4.
In support of these administrative agencies, the National Employment Lawyers
Association (NELA) recently threatened to boycott arbitral organizations, such as the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) and JAMS/Endispute, that administer employment
cases based on mandatory arbitration clauses. The NELA has been a strong opponent of such
clauses which the organization believes are unfair and violate statutory objectives. See
Domenic Bencivenga, FairPlay in the ADR Arena, HR MAGAZ IE, Jan. 1996, at 54; William
K. Slate U, Out-of-Court Resolution of Enployment Disputes, N.Y.LJ., Jan. 11, 1996, at 3.
In response to the proposed boycott, JAMSlEndispute restated its policy of not administering
arbitrations that limit employee rights or remedies. See Bencivenga, supra, at 54. The AAA
reiterated its View that it will turn down cases based on dispute resolution programs that are
unconscionable or violate minimum due process requirements. See id.; Slate, supra, at 3.
The NELA recently called off its boycott against JAMS/Endispute when that ADR
provider announced a new policy that establishes minimum standards of procedural fairness,
including reasonable diseovery, attorney representation and full judicial remedies. See Julie
Gannon Shoop, ADR Provider Averts Employment Lawyers' Boycott, TRIAL, Apr. 1996, at
73.
8 See infra notes 21-126 and accompanying text.
9 See Jorge Aquino, Shifing 'Sands of Arbitration Arena; Courts Have Begun Limiting
How Far Employers Can Go in Forcing Workers to Abide by Mandatory ADR Provisions,
RECORDER, March 24, 1995, at 1; Jay W. Waks & John Roberti, Challenges for Employment
Alternative Dispute Resolution, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 7, 1995, at S4.
10 See infra notes 12-73 and accompanying text. As to the waiver issue, it is important
to note that parties who voluntarily initiate an arbitration proceeding may not later try to deny
the arbitrator's authority. See Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that employee who voluntarily initiated corporate arbitration process was
bound by arbitrator's determination). In contrast, a party that participates in litigation and fails
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fairly protects procedural and substantive rights and remedies.1 In addition,
because the Supreme Court placed statutory employment disputes on the
same footing as other commercial disputes in the arbitration context, it is
useful to consider nonemployment cases in which courts have similarly
refused to enforce commercial arbitration clauses to help further illustrate
these new waves of litigation.
This Article will discuss both employment and nonemployment
commercial cases in which courts have struck down or modified PDAAs on
these grounds. These decisions provide some early indications of reasonable
limits on the utilization of PDAAs. The lessons learned from these cases
provide a foundation for making several important recommendations for
improving employment pre-dispute arbitration clauses and promoting
greater fairness in employment arbitration.
II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF WAIVER OF JUDICIAL FORUM
Courts and administrative agencies have reviewed the factual
circumstances of the waiver of the judicial forum to determine whether the
parties, and in particular the weaker party, intended to give up access to the
courts or the benefits of other statutory rights or remedies. Using common
contract parlance, the courts have looked at whether there was truly a
"meeting of the minds" when the agreement was reached or whether
circumstances such as fraud, coercion, ambiguity or unconscionability
prevented a knowing, voluntary waiver.
The legal threads of the waiver issue can first be found in the Gilmer
decision and are later discussed in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc.12 In interpreting the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration
to promptly request arbitration may waive its right to arbitrate a dispute. See Cabinetree of
Wisconsin, Inc. v. Krafimaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
even though plaintiff was not prejudiced, defendant waived arbitration by nine-month
participation in litigation); EZ Pawn Corp. v. Gonzalez, 921 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that employer waived arbitration through its knowing failure to reveal
arbitration agreement for two years).
1 See infra notes 87-126 and accompanying text.
12 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995). This case involved two investors who were awarded
$400,000 in punitive damages against a securities dealer. See id. at 1215. The investors did
not challenge the use of arbitration. Rather, they challenged lower court decisions that
interpreted the terms of the arbitration agreement as preventing the arbitral panel from
awarding punitive damages. See id. The dealer's standard investor agreement indicated that
the arbitration would be in accordance with the NASD rules that allow arbitrators to award
punitive damages. See id. at 1217. However, the agreement also included a choice-of-law
provision that selected the laws of the State of New York. See id. at 1216-1217. Under New
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agreements, the Gilmer and Mastrobuono decisions both considered the
background of the party challenging the interpretation of arbitration
agreements as well as the factual circumstances of the waiver.
In Gilmer, the Court pointed out that Gilmer was "an experienced
businessman" 13 who had not been "coerced or defrauded into agreeing to
the arbitration clause." 14 Rejecting Gilmer's claims about unequal
bargaining power, the Court viewed Gilmer's waiver as knowing and
voluntary, because he was a savvy broker who knew what he was sacrificing
by signing the form which included an arbitration clause.1
5
However, in Mastrobuono, the Court pointed out that the claimants,
Antonio and Diana Mastrobuono, were an assistant professor of medieval
literature and an artist, respectively. 16 Unlike Gilmer, neither of them was
considered an expert in investment transactions. In addition, the document
they signed was ambiguous as to the issue of the availability of punitive
damages. 17 Considering their business naivete and the lack of clarity in the
document, the Court concluded that the Mastrobuonos, unlike Gilmer, did
not fully understand what substantive rights they were waiving and allowed
them to collect punitive damages in derogation of New York state law.
As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that petitioners were actually
aware of New York's bifurcated approach to punitive damages, or
that they had any idea that by signing a standard form agreement to
arbitrate disputes they might be giving up an important substantive
right. In the face of such doubt, we are unwilling to impute this intent
to petitioners.
18
As to party intent and understanding of what rights are being
surrendered, these cases suggest that the clarity of the provision as well as
the level of one's business acumen can be factored into whether or not there
was a "meeting of the minds." In interpreting arbitration agreements,
ambiguous provisions will be interpreted against the drafter, and those not
York case law, arbitrators do not have the authority to award punitive damages. See id. at
1214. The Court ruled in favor of the investors. See id. at 1219.
13 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
14 See id.
15 See id. The Gilmer Court acknowledged that concerns about unequal bargaining
power should be determined on a case-by-case basis. See id.
16 See Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1214.
17 See id. at 1219. The Court applied the common law rule of contract interpretation that
holds that ambiguous language should be interpreted against the interest of the drafter. See id.
at 1219 n.10.
18 rd. at 1219.
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well-versed in business dealings may be treated differently than
experienced, knowledgeable business people. These factors illustrate a
continuing judicial willingness to protect weaker parties from stronger ones
that might try to use coercion, fraud, ambiguity or other unfair means to
secure arbitration agreements or, at least, more favorable terms under such
agreements. Also, since these cases put statutory employment disputes on
the same footing with other commercial disputes in the context of
arbitration, it is useful to consider nonemployment cases that have refused
to enforce commercial arbitration clauses for similar reasons.
A. Ambiguity in Arbitration Provisions
Since Gilmer and Mastrobuono, other lower federal courts have
determined that ambiguous language will provide a basis for invalidating an
arbitration clause in employment cases. However, striking down arbitration
agreements based on ambiguity is not limited to statutory employment
claims. Since Gilmer allowed courts to review PDAAs in a light similar to
other nonemployment commercial clauses, it is important to note that issues
of ambiguity are also being utilized to reject the enforcement of arbitration
clauses in such cases.19 What amounts to ambiguity in a provision is not
clear-cut, with courts reviewing similar clauses arriving at opposite
outcomes.20 In some instances, courts interpret ambiguity as involving a
lack of clarity in an arbitration provision about the use of arbitration or the
lack of specificity about the nature of the claims covered under that process.
In other cases, ambiguity may be drawn from a patchwork of provisions that
are confusing or inconsistent about the utilization of arbitration. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court will need to more explicitly address the concept and
parameters of ambiguity in such disputes.
Initially, in Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood,2 1 the Seventh Circuit
found ambiguity when it determined that the NASD rules failed to clearly
19 As in Mastrobuono, the lack of clarity in the arbitration provision is interpreted
against the interests of the drafter. See infra notes 21-43 and accompanying text. But see
Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, 844 F. Supp. 1103, 1106 (W.D. Va. 1994)
(dismissing ADA lawsuit because collective bargaining agreement clearly specified use of
-internal grievance procedure for ADA claims); Mittendorf v. Stone Lumber, 874 F. Supp.
292, 295 (D. Ore. 1994) (holding that arbitration clauses were clearly set out in contract in
which there was no showing of unequal bargaining power); Bleumer v. Parkway Ins. Co.,
649 A.2d 913, 923 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) (holding that detailed, extensive
termination provisions, including arbitration clause, compel use of arbitration under whistle-
blower statute).
20 See infra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
21 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993).
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specify that employment disputes were covered under the arbitration
provisions of the U-4 form.22 Rejecting affidavits and other NASD internal
documents, the court refused to compel arbitration because of the ambiguity
in the NASD code regarding the nature of the disputes subject to
arbitration. 23 The court recommended that to avoid confusion the NASD
should amend its code language to explicitly address the issue of
employment disputes.24 Therefore, the court refused to enforce the
arbitration provision due to a lack of specificity about the type of claims
covered under the arbitration provision.
Even in instances in which both parties are businesses negotiating on an
equal footing, arbitration clauses may also be struck down because the
disputes covered are not clearly identified. For example, the Ninth Circuit
held that a claim for the misappropriation of trade secrets was not arbitrable
due to ambiguity in an arbitration provision. In Tracer Research Corp. v.
National Environmental Services Co. (NESCO), 25 the parties had entered
into a licensing agreement, which contained an arbitration clause, for the
use of Tracer's tank and pipeline leak detection process. 26 After termination
of the licensing agreement, Tracer contended that NESCO continued to use
22 See id. at 1255. In reviewing sections I and 8 of the NASD rules, the court wrote that
"[olur opinion holds that the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers do not
provide for arbitration of employment disputes. Although we acknowledged that the language
of the NASD's rules could be stretched to cover such disputes, we conclude that this was not
the most natural reading." rd. But see Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 32 F.3d 516,
519 (11th Cir. 1994).
23 See id. at 1255-1256. The court stated that "[nothing in any of the materials
defendants have submitted to us explains how the existing language reasonably can be
interpreted to require arbitration of employment disputes." Id. at 1257.
2 4 See id. at 1256. After Farrand, the NASD revised its code provisions in 1993 with
the approval of the SEC to specifically address employment disputes. See 58 Fed. Reg.
45,932 (1993); see also DAVID S. RUDER ET AL., SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM, REPORT
OF THE ARBITRATION PoucY TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS 113-115 (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter RUDER REPORT].
Revised Section I states that the NASD code applies to "the arbitration of any dispute, claim,
or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any member of the
Association, or arising out of the employment or termination of employment of associated
person(s) with any member." NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS CODE OF
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 1 (1993). Amended Section 8 also requires arbitration for "any
dispute, claim or controversy ... arising out of the employment or termination of
employment of such associated person(s) with such member." Id. § 8. See RUDER REPORT,
supra, at 113 n.146.
25 42 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 37 (1995).
2 6 See id. at 1293.
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their confidential information and trade secrets to market an alternative
product. 27 An arbitral panel dismissed Tracer's claims for misappropriation
of trade secrets and Tracer sought to compel arbitration of those charges. 28
The court reiterated that it would not require parties to arbitrate
disputes unless they had explicitly agreed to do so. 29 In reviewing the
language of the clause, the court found that the clause only applied clearly
to contract claims. Therefore, the court refused to mandate arbitration of the
tort claim of misappropriation of trade secrets.30
As in Gilmer and Mastrobuono, the issue of ambiguity can also be
linked with the level of business experience of a weaker party to determine
the validity of an arbitration agreement. The Ninth Circuit's decision in
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai3t rejected an arbitration clause based on a
combination of ambiguity in the arbitration clause and a lack of business
acumen in the weaker party in the dispute. The case involved two women
who applied for and had been hired for positions as sales representatives
with Prudential in 1989. In 1990, the women sued Prudential and their
immediate supervisor in state court for rape, sexual harassment and sexual
abuse. Prudential went to federal court to compel arbitration because the
women had signed the U-4 form.
32
The women were recent immigrants to the United States with limited
language skills when they applied. 33 Unlike Gilmer, who was an investment
manager, they were applying for entry-level positions as sales
27 See id. at 1293-1294. Tracer initially succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction
against NESCO on its trademark, trade secrets and contract claims. See Id. at 1294.
28 See id. at 1294. The arbitral panel permanently enjoined NESCO from using Tracer's
trademark and found that NESCO had breached the licensing agreement through its use of
Tracer's confidential information. Once the panel handed down its decision, NESCO sought
to dissolve the preliminary injunction that the district court granted. See id. Tracer appealed
that decision. See id.
29 See id. at 1294.
30 The court determined that the clause referring to claims "arising out of this
Agreement" limited Tracer's claims to contractual issues only. See id. at 1294.
31 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995). But see Hall v.
MetLife Resources, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,742 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting
Prudential and holding that one who signs a contract is expected to be aware of its terms and
conditions).
32 See Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1301. The U-4 form the women had signed referred to the
NASD Code provisions prior to the 1993 amendments. See supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
33 See id. at 1301. See also Jorge Aquino, Ninth Circuit Limits Arbitration of Disputes In
the Workplace, RECORDER, Dec. 21, 1994, at 1. The women had lived in the United States
for less than two years when they were hired by Prudential. See id.
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representatives and were not experienced business people.34 Based on their
inexperience in the securities industry, the women claimed that they were
advised that the form was merely an application to take a test and were told
to sign the documents without being given an opportunity to read them. In
addition, no mention was ever made about arbitration nor were the women
given a copy of the NASD manual containing the terms of arbitration.
35
Relying on congressional intent regarding Title VII, the court restated
the view that the parties must make a knowing and voluntary waiver of their
rights to pursue judicial relief for statutory discrimination claims.36
Initially, the court held that the language in the U-4 form failed to identify
explicitly the types of disputes covered under arbitration, employment or
otherwise.
37
To determine the actual disputes involved, the parties would have to
consult the NASD manual, which they were not given. Citing Farrand, the
court added that even if the women had been given the NASD manual, that
document was also too vague and did not specify that statutory employment
34 See Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1301, 1305. The court notes that Gilmer, as an
"experienced businessman," had knowingly agreed to submit his dispute to arbitration. See id.
at 1305.
35 See id. at 1301, 1303.
36 See id. at 1304-1305. The court considered the House Report on the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 which sought to increase plaintiff options to seek relief by encouraging, but not
mandating, the use of ADR. See id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 40(1), 102nd Cong., reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635). The court also quoted former Senate Majority Leader Robert
Dole, who stated that arbitration under Title VI1 was only appropriate "where the parties
knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods." Id. at 1305 (citing 137 CONG. REc.
S15472, S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole)).
37 See id. at 1305.
In this case, even assuming that the appellants were aware of the nature of the U-4 form,
they could not have understood that in signing it, they were agreeing to arbitrate sexual
discrimination suits. The U-4 form did not purport to describe the types of disputes that
were to be subject to arbitration.
Id.
The NASD has recognized this problem also. In order to eliminate any ambiguity as to
the arbitrability of statutory civil rights claims, the Ruder Report recommended that the U-4
form be revised to specifically state that employment disputes, including those involving
statutory civil rights claims, are subject to arbitration, and that Section 8 be further amended
to explicitly mention the arbitrability of such statutory claims. See RUDER REPORT, supra note
24, at 120.
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claims were arbitrable.3 8 Because of the ambiguity in the provisions, the
maze-like quality of the agreement and the women's lack of business
experience, the court concluded that the women could not have been
expected to understand that they were agreeing to arbitrate their Title VII
claims. The court would not compel arbitration of the dispute because the
women had not knowingly waived their rights.39 The issues of ambiguity in
the arbitration agreement, linked to the lack of business experience of the
weaker party, provided the basis for the court to reject the PDAA.
Similar to Farrand and Prudential, ambiguity again arose due to a
maze-like approach to an arbitration agreement in Segall v. Tenet
Healthcare Corp.40 In that case, there was conflicting language between an
employee handbook and a separate arbitration agreement. A fired employee
sought to bring an action for wrongful discharge under the provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The company sought to compel
arbitration pointing to the company's arbitration policy (spelled out on a
separate sheet of paper) that referred employees to an arbitration process
contained in the employee handbook. However, the employee handbook
contained a detailed disclaimer that stated that the handbook was not a
binding contract and could not be modified without the written agreement of
a company executive director or senior officer.41 The court determined that
38 See Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305. "Moreover, even if appellants had signed a contract
containing the NASD arbitration clause, it would not put them on notice that they were bound
to arbitrate Title VII claims. That provision does not even refer to employment disputes." Id.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Norris indicated that the court need not have expressed its
view on congressional intent about waivers or the circumstances of the waiver in this case. He
believed that a reliance on Farrand alone provided an adequate basis for refusing to compel
arbitration. See id. at 1305-1306 (Norris, J., concurring).
39 See id. at 1305. However, several district courts have rejected Prudential and its
emphasis on a knowing and voluntary waiver, asserting that Prudential contradicts Gilmer and
its view of congressional intent. These district courts have emphasized that a party that signs a
contract is presumed to know and assent to its content in the absence of fraud or other
wrongful conduct. But see DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Beauchamp v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 918 F.
Supp. 1091, 1098-1099 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100,
107 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
40 No. 95-1317 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 1995). See also Are Non-Competes, Arbitration
Pacts, Etc. Invalid If They're in an 'Employee Handbook'?, LAW. WKLY. USA, June 17,
1996, at 10 [hereinafter Invalid Employee Handbook Arbitration Pacts].
41 A disclaimer in the front of the employee manual stated that the handbook was "not
intended to constitute a legal contract with any employee or group of employees because that
can only occur with a written agreement executed by a facility executive director and [a]
senior executive officer [of the company]." Invalid Employee Handbook Arbitration Pacts,
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"[s]ince by its own terms, the handbook is not a binding agreement,
defendants cannot rely upon its provisions to compel arbitration." 42 Here,
the ambiguity arose due to inconsistency between the terms of a company
arbitration policy and the language in the employee handbook. Due to the
inconsistency of the provisions and the language of the disclaimer, the
employee was allowed to bring his ADA action in the courts.43
Outside the employment sphere, Broemmer v. Abonion Services of
Phoenix, Ltd., 44 ties together the issues of ambiguity in the PDAA and the
lack of experience of a weaker party to strike down an arbitration
agreement, as in Prudential. In Broemmer, the Supreme Court of Arizona
considered a medical malpractice claim resulting from an abortion.45 In
overturning the lower courts, the court determined that the agreement was
unconscionable based upon the circumstances surrounding the waiver
process, including ambiguity in the arbitration agreement and the plaintiff's
personal circumstances.
46
supra note 40, at 10. A second version of the disclaimer was included at the end of the
manual above the employee's signature stating that "Inmo written agreement concerning
employment terms or conditions is valid unless signed by a facility executive director, and [a]
senior officer [of the company], and no written statement or agreement in this handbook
concerning employment is binding since provisions are subject to change." Id.
42 Id. Similarly, in Heuriebise v. Reliable Business Computers, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 243
(Mich. 1996), the Supreme Court of Michigan refused to enforce an arbitration clause, in
part, because of disclaimer language in an employee handbook. See id. at 247. Unlike the
arbitration clause in Segall, the arbitration clause in Heurrebise was contained in the handbook
with clear contract disclaimers, and there was no conflict between an independent policy and
the terms of the handbook. See id. The court determined that since no contract existed under
the handbook, the clause was not enforceable. See id. A minority of the court went on further
to decide that state discrimination claims as a matter of public policy may not be the subject of
a PDAA as a condition of employment. See id. at 256. They determined that such PDAAs
contravene public policy, elaborating on the state's long history of defending civil rights
through the judicial forum. See id. at 250-256. See also Lambdin v. Dist. Court of Arapahoe
County, 903 P. 2d 1126, 1129 (Colo. 1995) (striking down PDAA as violative of express
language of state's Wage Claim Act).
43 See Invalid Employee Handbook Arbitration Pacts, supra note 40, at 10.
44 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
45 Broemmer suffered a punctured uterus during the abortion that required follow-up
medical treatment. She filed a medical malpractice suit against the clinic doctor and the clinic
sought to compel arbitration. See id. at 1015.
46 See id. at 1014, 1017. The defendants sought to dismiss the plaintiff's action,
asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the arbitration clause. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defendants. At the time of the trial court's action, plaintiff's
affidavits were the only evidence provided to the court. On appeal, the court of appeals held
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In this case, Melinda Broemmer was an unmarried twenty-one year old
who was sixteen or seventeen weeks pregnant. Broemmer was a high school
graduate earning only about one hundred dollars a week with no medical
benefits. The court stated that she was experiencing a great deal of physical
and emotional turmoil, with the father-to-be pressuring her to obtain an
abortion and her parents advising against the procedure. 4
7
Ultimately, she sought the abortion and was required to first complete
three forms, one of which was a separate PDAA. The PDAA was never
explained to her nor was the arbitration clause pointed out to Broemmer.
The clinic never provided her with any copies of the documents. Broemmer
alleged that she never recalled signing the arbitration agreement and still
remains unsure about what arbitration means.
48
The court determined that the PDAA was a contract of adhesion
because Broemmer was provided the document on a "take it or leave it"
basis as a condition of treatment. Broemmer was not allowed to negotiate
the terms of the agreement nor did clinic staff indicate that she had the
option to refuse to sign the document. 49 However, the court indicated that
such contracts are enforceable if the provisions fall within the reasonable
expectations of the weaker party or the terms are not unduly oppressive or
unconscionable.50 The court added that it favored the use of PDAAs, but
only when such agreements had been freely and fairly entered into by the
parties.
51
that the PDAA was a contract of adhesion, but was enforceable since its terms were within the
plaintiff's reasonable expectations and, therefore, were not unconscionable. See id. at 1015.
47 See id. at 1014.
48 See id. at 1014, 1017. In his dissent, Justice Martone argued for the enforcement of
the PDAA, noting that Broemmer was an adult and that the PDAA was a separate form
which, in bold-faced, capitalized type, stated: "PLEASE READ THIS CONTRACT
CAREFULLY AS IT EFFECTS [sic] YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS." Below this statement it
read "AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE." Id. at 1018 (Martone, I., dissenting).
49 See id. at 1016. The clause required the American Arbitration Association to
administer the arbitration and the arbitrator to be a licensed doctor of obstetricsigynecology.
The court considered this limit as favoring the clinic over the plaintiff. See id.
So See id. at 1016.
51 See id. at 1017-1018. The court refused to make any generalized statement against
PDAAs, preferring to limit its review to a case-by-case approach. See id. at 1018. The court
noted:
[W]e restate our firm conviction that arbitration and other methods of alternative dispute
resolution play important and desirable roles in our system of dispute resolution. We
encourage their use. When agreements are freely and fairly entered, they will be
welcomed and enforced. They will not, however, be exempted from the usual rules of
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In reviewing the PDAA, the court also determined that the clause was
ambiguous because there was no explicit language indicating that medical
malpractice claims were subject to arbitration or that Broemmer was
waiving her right to a jury trial for such claims. Considering her emotional
stress, her lack of commercial experience and the ambiguity of the
provision, the court determined that the clause was outside the plaintiff's
reasonable expectations. The court struck down the clause and permitted
Broemmer to bring her medical malpractice claim in the courts.5 2 As in
Gilmer, Farrand and Prudential, the court refused to compel arbitration
because the provision failed to specify the nature of claims covered under
arbitration. In addition, as in Gilmer and Prudential, the Broemmer court
considered the factual circumstances of the waiver, including the lack of
understanding and bargaining power of the weaker party, in rejecting the
arbitration provision.
Based on these cases, PDAAs need to clearly identify the claims being
covered under the arbitration clause. In addition, the courts will offer
protection to weaker parties who lack the business expertise to understand
the rights they are waiving under a PDAA.
B. Fraud, Deceit and Other Coercive Conduct in the Waiver Process
Although there are some disagreements on the issue of ambiguity, the
United States Supreme Court53 and most lower courtM clearly agree that
fraud, duress and other coercive conduct will invalidate an arbitration
clause. Fraud, duress and coercive conduct prevent a party from making a
truly knowing and voluntary waiver of their rights to a judicial forum.
Again, courts will evaluate the factual circumstances of the waiver in
determining whether to enforce an arbitration provision. Several challenges
to employment arbitration clauses have been successful on these grounds. In
addition, as with cases involving ambiguity, issues of coercive conduct have
also led courts to invalidate arbitration clauses found in nonemployment
arbitration cases. In these nonemployment cases, the court also considered
contract law.... Our enthusiasm for arbitration in general does not permit us to ignore
the realities present in this case.
Id.
52 See Id. at 1017-1018. The court noted that since the terms were not within the
plaintiffs reasonable expectations, there was no need to reach the issue of unconscionability.
See id. at 1017.
53 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24, 33; Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1216.
See supra notes 19, 46-52 and accompanying text; infra notes 55-86 and
accompanying text.
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the business sophistication of the weaker parties as in the ambiguity cases
discussed above.
In EZ Pawn Corp. v. Gonzalez,55 a Texas appeals court considered
whether a discharged employee would be required to utilize arbitration for
claims of negligent hiring and disability discrimination. 5 6 In that case,
company supervisors told Gonzalez, a store manager, that he must sign a
particular document to start the process for receiving stock options and to
retain his employment.5 7 In reviewing testimony in the dispute, the appeals
court agreed with the trial court that the managers had fraudulently
represented the document that was not necessary for the receipt of stock
options. The appeals court supported the trial court's view that the main
purpose of the agreement was to induce fraudulently Gonzalez and other
store managers to submit employment disputes to arbitration.-" The appeals
court affirmed the trial court's refusal to compel arbitration under the
employment arbitration agreement.5 9
In EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic (ROlD), an
administrative action, the EEOC recently secured an injunction against a
company whose ADR policy was misleading, retaliatory and inconsistent
with the principles of Title VII. The EEOC had asserted that ROID had
instituted a coercive ADR policy after twenty-one employees filed sexual
harassment and retaliation complaints with the EEOC.6 1 Six females who
had filed sexual harassment charges against a company manager were fired
or forced to resign. Soon thereafter more workers filed retaliation claims
with the EEOC based on the situation. To respond to the mounting
55 921 S.W.2d 320 (1ex. Ct. App. 1996). The appeals court upheld a trial court's denial
of an employer's motion to compel arbitration based on fraud and the employer's intentional
delay in seeking arbitration. See id. at 324-325.
5 6 See id. at 321.
57 See id. at 322, 324-325.
51 See id. at 324-325.
59 See id.
60 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1243 (S.D. Tex. 1995). ROID is one of the largest
medical X-ray companies in Houston, with about 150 workers. See EEOC Agrees with
Houston Medical Form on Permanent Halt to Mandatory ADR Plan, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 127, at d6 (July 3, 1995) [hereinafter EEOC Halts Mandatory ADR Plan].
61 See River Oaks, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1243: EEOC Halts Mandatory ADR
Plan, supra note 60, at d6. See also Waks & Roberti, supra note 9, at S4; Bencivenga, supra
note 7, at 53. Aside from deterring EEOC complaints, the policy also required employees
alone to pay for the costs of any ADR proceedings. See River Oaks, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
at 1243-1244.
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complaints, ROe then moved to force employees to sign arbitration
agreements in order to keep their jobs.
62
The court agreed with the EEOC and enjoined ROID from requiring
any present or future employees to agree to the retaliatory policy or
attempting reprisals against those who filed complaints with the EEOC or
opposed the policy.63 In addition, ROID is prevented from making
damaging disclosures about discharged employees who filed discrimination
complaints."M
Similarly, the NLRB authorized the filing of an unfair labor practice
against Bentley's Luggage Corporation for firing an employee who refused
to agree to a mandatory employment arbitration policy.
65 The fired
employee, Bob Letwin, had filed a complaint with the NLRB asserting that
the compulsory ADR policy violated his right to NLRB protection for any
employee efforts to unionize and to undertake other collective actions.6
Letwin's firing was clearly in retaliation for his efforts to protect his
statutory rights to access the courts. After reviewing Letwin's complaint,
the NLRB indicated that the company's mandatory arbitration policy
violated the National Labor Relations Act and is seeking to rescind the
62 See EEOC Halts Mandatory ADR Plan, supra note 60, at d6.
63 See River Oaks, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1243-1244. The court did not decide
whether employees discharged for retaliatory reasons should be immediately reinstated,
,leaving those issues open for future proceedings. See id. at 1244. Ultimately, ROMD entered
into a consent decree with the EEOC that finalized the court's preliminary injunction into a
permanent order. See EEOC Halts Mandatory ADR Plan, supra note 60, at d6.
64 In handling job references, the court limited ROID's disclosure about discharged
employees to providing dates of employment, job descriptions and compensation. See River
Oaks, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1244.
65 See Bentley's Luggage Corp., NLRB Case No. 12-CA-16658 (Advice Memorandum
issued Aug. 21, 1995). See also Slate, supra note 7, at 3; Catherine Wilson, NLRB Contesting
Employer Insistence on Mandatory Arbitration Policies, DAILY RECoRD, Sept. 6, 1995, at 12.
The arbitration clause stated: "By remaining a Bentley employee, you agree that, before filing
any legal action regarding your employment or the termination of your employment, the
dispute will be submitted to binding arbitration before a neutral third party pursuant to the
procedures of the American Arbitration Association." Id. See also Skoler et al., Recent
Developments in Labor Law, MASS. EMPLOYMENT L. LETER, Jan. 1996. The NLRB is also
reviewing a second case in which another employer fired a worker who refused to sign an
arbitration agreement. See Great Western Financial Corp., NLRB Case No. 12-CA-166886
(Advice Memorandum issued Aug. 15, 1996); Slate, supra note 7.
66 See Wilson, supra note 65, at 12; Susan Barciela, Fired Worker Challenges
Mandatory Arbitration, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 24, 1995, at IC. Letwin said, "When I first
read the policy, I could hardly believe what I was reading, and then I reread it and was firmly
convinced that it was a company plot to take away all of the rights that an employee has." Id.
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policy.67 Clearly, waivers of a judicial forum that reflect an employer's
fraudulent, misleading or retaliatory conduct are not valid, and arbitration
will not be compelled under these circumstances.
Further, in nonemployment commercial disputes, courts review
fraudulent or coercive conduct in the context of the business expertise of the
weaker parties. A California appeals court, in Bell v. Congress Mortgage
Co. ,6 reviewed the circumstances of the inclusion of an arbitration clause
buried in mortgage refinancing documents. 69 A group of borrowers claimed
that the mortgage company's conduct illustrated a pattern and practice of
unfair, unlawful and fraudulent business practices. 70 Initially, the court
determined that the documents, which included the arbitration clause,
formed a contract of adhesion. However, the court noted that such contracts
are not always unenforceable. Like Broemmer, the Bell decision indicated
that such contracts are enforceable if the disputed contract provision falls
within the "reasonable expectations" of the weaker party, is consistent with
general contract principles of equity and therefore is not "unfairly
oppressive or unconscionable." 71 In determining the enforceability of the
arbitration clause, the court considered the relative bargaining strengths of
the parties, the facts surrounding the contract negotiations and execution
and the placement and conspicuousness of the arbitration provision.
72
As in Gilmer, Mastrobuono and Prudential, the court considered the
business sophistication of the consumers in the waiver process. The court
found that the borrowers were primarily "elderly, unsophisticated and
financially distressed individuals who relied upon the good graces of skilled
sales persons from a substantial corporate lender."73 Unlike the brokerage
manager in Gilmer, the borrowers in Bell and the sales applicants in
67 See Id. at IC, 3C; Skoler et al., supra note 65.
68 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The California Supreme Court rejected a
request to rehear the case brought by appellant, Congress Mortgage Company. See 1994 Cal.
LEXIS 4258 (Calif. July 28, 1994). The court also ordered without explanation that the
opinion not be published in the official reporter. See id. Although the decision will not be
officially published, it raises important issues of fraudulent or coercive conduct regarding
commercial arbitration provisions. In addition, even though the case is not in an official
reporter, it may be found in electronic databases by its official cite.
69 See id. at 207. The court wrote that the clause was not highlighted and was placed
within a larger packet of real estate documents. See id. at 208.
70 See id. at 207-209. The borrowers were unable to pay the refinanced loans and had
lost their homes to foreclosure or were under threat of foreclosure. See id.
71 Id. at 208-209.
72 See id. at 209-210.
73 Id. at 209. See also infra notes 114-120 and accompanying text.
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Prudential were not experienced business people. In addition, the weaker
parties were not represented by counsel at the signing of the documents. 74
The court also evaluated the placement of the provision and the
circumstances of the waiver to decide enforceability.
We look, therefore, to the volume of the documents, ... the
existence of a check off or other method of highlighting the
provision, the verbal instructions provided, and the nature of any
rights surrendered. Here, the compelled arbitration clause was placed
in a paragraph in the middle of one of the documents. It was in no
way highlighted or otherwise set apart. More importantly, it was
contained in a document whose every other significant provision was
a recitation of rights guaranteed the borrower. In that context, the
potential for misapprehension is substantial.7 5
Furthermore, the court stated that the parties did not have a chance to read
nor were they ever informed about the arbitration provision.
76
In reviewing the nature of the rights being given up by the parties, the
court recognized that the clause required the parties to surrender their state
constitutional right to a jury trial. 77 The court recognized that parties may
waive their right to use the judicial forum. However, considering the
importance of this constitutional right, the court stated that any waiver must
be a clear and informed waivdr, not a casual or accidental one. 78 Based on
all of these factors as to the waiver, the court decided that the arbitration
clause was not enforceable because it was not within the reasonable
expectations of the weaker party.
7 9
To avoid fraud, deceit or other misunderstandings, the court
recommended that arbitration clauses in adhesive contracts should be
conspicuous through bold or highlighted print type. In addition, the court
suggested that there must be a clear acknowledgment that the party is
74 See id. at 209 n.3. The court decided that the fact that the borrowers later consulted
an attorney after the execution of the documents was irrelevant to the dispute. See id.
75 Id. at 209 (footnote omitted).
76 See id. at 207, 209 n.3. Concerning other provisions in the agreement, the appeals
court also noted that the trial record showed that the mortgage company had clearly engaged
in conduct intended to deceive borrowers about their contract rights by leaving many blanks in
the contract and modifying the documents after execution. See Id. at 207, 209. See also infra
notes 114-120 and accompanying text.
77 See id. at 209. The decision indicated that article 1, section 16 of California's
Constitution guarantees the state right to a jury trial. See id.
78 See id. at 209-210.
79 See id. at 208, 210.
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waiving their right to a jury trial through some kind of separate check off or
initialing mechanism.
80
In another commercial case, 17T Commercial Finance Corp. (17T) v.
Tyler,81 a Massachusetts trial court refused to enforce an arbitral award, 82
concluding that the arbitration agreement was invalid because of economic
duress.8 3 In that case, ITT had provided some initial financing to a
corporation, Sunshine Home Entertainment Centers (Sunshine), guaranteed
by the Tylers, corporate officers for Sunshine. Sunshine sought to extend its
credit agreement with IT and engaged in several months of negotiations on
the new credit terms, which appeared acceptable to I1T. 84
Based on favorable representations from TT about the credit extension,
the Tylers purchased some commercial property prior to the final execution
of the revised financing agreement. After purchasing the property, ITT then
refused to stand by the renegotiated terms and provided the Tylers with a
new agreement that contained an arbitration clause. If the Tylers failed to
sign the new documents, ITT threatened to accelerate its payment demands
for the Sunshine loan and to refuse to provide the much-needed additional
credit. Fearing company bankruptcy and personal financial ruin, the Tylers
believed they had no alternative but to sign the new documents. 85
The court found that ITT had confused and misled the Tylers
throughout the financing negotiations. The court also determined that =T
had contributed significantly to the Tylers financial turmoil. Due to ITr's
conduct, the Tylers truly believed that they had to sign the new documents
containing the arbitration clause. Therefore, the court refused to enforce the
arbitral award and invalidated the arbitration agreement due to economic
duress.
86
Clearly, no fraudulent, retaliatory or misleading representations should
be made when presenting a party with a PDAA. Such conduct will be
viewed as vitiating a knowing and voluntary waiver of the courts under a
80 See id. at 210.
8' No. 917660, 1994 WL 879497 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1994).
82 See id. at *7 An arbitrator had awarded lT $578,000, for which IT sought judicial
confirmation and enforcement. See id. at *4.
83 See id. at *5. The court indicated that the elements of economic duress are: "(1) that
one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another, (2) that circumstances permitted no other
alternative; (3) that said circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite party."
Id.
84See id. at *1, *2.
85 See id. at *6. The court found that without the promised credit and inventory from
rT and the risk of accelerated loan payments, the Tylers had a realistic fear of financial
disaster. See id.
8 6 See id. at *5, "7.
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PDAA. As in the relevant ambiguity cases above, the status of the parties,
particularly the party lacking bargaining power or business expertise, will
only further strengthen the grounds for invalidating the arbitration
agreement.
]I. FAIRNESS OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
The issue of fairness extends beyond a knowing and voluntary waiver
of the judicial forum to encompass fairness in arbitral proceedings. Once
again the Gilmer decision provides a starting point for these discussions. On
the surface, the Gilmer Court seemed to brush aside the issue of substantive
and procedural differences between arbitration and litigation. Yet, a closer
analysis provides some clues on appropriate standards that are addressed in
recent substantive and procedural challenges to arbitration clauses.
A. Protection of Substantive Rights and Statutory Remedies
The Gilmer Court clearly stated that parties agreeing to use arbitration
were merely exchanging the forum for resolution and were not surrendering
any substantive rights or statutory remedies.87 For example, the Court
indicated that the switch to an arbitral forum did not limit the arbitrator's
authority to grant equitable and legal relief in disputes involving statutory
rights. 88 Some recent cases have challenged mandatory arbitration clauses
that impinge on constitutional and statutory rights. As explained in previous
parts of this Article, the need to protect substantive rights and statutory
remedies may also provide a basis for striking down arbitration clauses in
nonemployment commercial cases.
At a minimum, Gilmer would lend support to the modification of the
mandatory arbitration clause in the Bentley's Luggage Company dispute.8 9
In that case, the arbitration policy allowed the arbitrator to award damages
for back pay and emotional distress, but not punitive damages. 90 Therefore,
under Gilmer, that provision is inconsistent with the ADEA and may be
invalidated, or at least modified, to allow for the recovery of punitive
damages.
87 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31-32. The Court further added that the use of arbitration
does not bar investigatory or enforcement authority of administrative agencies like the EEOC.
See id. at 32; supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
88 See id. at 32.
89 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
90 See Skoler et al., supra note 65.
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Recently, in Board of Education of Carlsbad Municipal Schools v.
Harrell,91 the New Mexico Supreme Court modified an arbitral provision
that limited a party's right to appeal an arbitral award to issues of collusion,
bias and corruption. 92 The case involved mandatory arbitration under state
statute of a school superintendent's discharge. The court noted that the
judiciary retains its authority to review arbitral awards for compliance with
state constitutional due process standards, not just bias or impartiality
issues, and struck down that portion of the arbitration provision. 93 The
court emphasized the importance of protecting substantive due process
rights and reiterated its authority to review arbitral awards for constitutional
compliance.
In a commercial dispute, Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Products Co.,94 the
Ninth Circuit rejected an entire arbitration clause that limited statutory
remedies provided under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA).95
In that case, ARCO had included an arbitration clause in its franchise
agreement with Graham Oil that barred the recovery of exemplary damages
and attorney's fees. Also, the arbitration provision required Graham Oil to
bring any claims within as little as ninety days in some instances.
96
However, under the PMPA, franchisees are entitled to recover
exemplary damages and attorney's fees for certain cases. 97 In addition, the
PMPA contains a one-year statute of limitations for franchisee claims.
98
Therefore, the court in Graham Oil concluded that the arbitration provision
was attempting to circumvent important PMPA rights or benefits meant to
protect the more vulnerable parties, the gasoline franchisees.
99
91 882 P.2d 511 (N.M. 1994).
92 See id. at 514-515.
93 See id. at 526.
94 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994).
95 See id. at 1248. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (1995). The PMPA seeks to
provide certain rights or protections for gasoline station franchisees in disputes with major oil
producers. See Graham Oil, 43 F.3d at 1246.
96 See Graham Oil, 43 F.3d at 1247-1248.
97 See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 2805(d)(1)(B) (1995) (exemplary damages); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2805(d)(1)(C) (1995) (attorney's fees).
98 See Graham Oil, 43 F.3d at 1248. See also 15 U.S.C. § 2805(a) (one-year statute of
limitations).
99 The court determined:
Each of the three statutory rights is important to the effectuation of the PMPA's policies.
The purpose of the exemplary damages is to deter franchisors from engaging in
improper terminations of franchise agreements. The purpose of the attorney's fees is to
deter franchisors from improperly contesting meritorious claims. Finally, the purpose of
the one-year statute of limitations is to afford franchisees a reasonable period in which to
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The Ninth Circuit refused to merely modify the provision to exclude
those components, declaring that the illegal terms were highly integrated
portions of a uniform dispute resolution procedure.100 The decision
indicated that the entire provision was tainted because it showed a clear
attempt by ARCO to subvert congressional mandates through arbitration.
10 1
The court struck down the entire clause as violative of the PMPA and stated
that a court must now resolve the dispute between the parties. 102 The cases
show an effort to protect both substantive constitutional rights as well as the
statutory rights and remedies of parties. A PDAA that seeks to limit court
review of constitutional rights such as substantive due process, or statutory
rights and remedies such as statutes of limitation or statutory damages, may
be rejected.
B. Maintaining Minimum Procedural Standards
Aside from the protection of substantive rights, the Gilmer decision
also considered the issue of procedural differences between arbitration and
litigation,10 3 seeming at the outset to discount procedural concerns about
arbitrator selection, 104 limited discovery 05 and the lack of written
seek relief for improper terminations and other abuses by petroleum franchisors. In
attempting to strip franchisees of these statutory rights and benefits by means of an
arbitration clause ... ARCO violated the purpose as well as the specific terms of the
PMPA.
Graham Oil, 43 F.3d at 1248.
10 0 See id. at 1248.
101 See id. at 1248-1249. The court wrote that "ARCO attempted to use an arbitration
clause to achieve its unlawful ends. Such a blatant misuse of the arbitration procedure serves
to taint the entire clause. As a leading treatise notes, severance is inappropriate when the
entire clause represents an 'integrated scheme to contravene public policy.'" Id. (citing E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.8, at 70 (1990)).
102 See Graham Oil, 43 F.3d at 1248-1249.
103 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 30-32. To the contrary. it is interesting to note that court
dicta in Prudential asserted that procedural differences between litigation and arbitration can
be significant, at least in instances concerning rape, sexual harassment and abuse. The court
noted that privacy rights receive greater protection in litigation than arbitration, under state
statutory limits on discovery and admissibility of a party's sexual history. See Prudential, 42
F.3d at 1305 n.4.
104 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32.
10 5 The Court stated that limited discovery had not harmed the resolution of RICO and
antitrust claims which are as complicated as any ADEA claim. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
Furthermore, arbitrators are not limited by the rules of evidence, so a broader range of
documentation and testimony are allowed to support one's claims. See id. at31.
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decisions. 1°6 But a closer inspection indicates that the Court clearly
established certain minimum procedural standards in rejecting Gilmer's
procedural arguments.
As to the issue of arbitrator selection, the Gilmer decision rejected
generalized claims of arbitral bias, but only after recognizing the parties'
rights to review arbitrator backgrounds, challenge arbitrator participation
and appeal arbitral awards on the grounds of bias. 107 The Court rejected any
presumption of bias in arbitral panels, noting that the applicable arbitration
process provided background information to parties on potential arbitrators
and allowed both a preemptory challenge and unlimited challenges for
cause. 10 8 In addition, the Court noted that the FAA allows courts to vacate
awards based on bias or corruption of the arbitral panel.109 Therefore, any
process that fails to provide these procedural protections against bias might
be successfully challenged.
Regarding limited discovery, the Gilmer Court did not support the
notion that all opportunities for discovery could be banned in arbitration.
The Court accepted the notion of limited discovery, noting that the
applicable arbitration rules did allow for document productions, information
requests, depositions and witness subpoenas.110 In addition, the Court noted
that limited discovery did not prevent a party from having a full opportunity
to present their side of the case with arbitrators not limited to the rules of
evidence. 1 Clearly, any arbitral procedure that bars all discovery or
prevents parties from fairly presenting their claims would likely be
successfully challenged under Gilmer.
The Gilmer Court also considered the lack of written decisions in
arbitration. Gilmer argued that the lack of written opinions would protect
discriminatory employers from public exposure and limit effective appellate
106 Gilmer argued that the lack of written opinions would stifle the development of
ADEA precedent, protect discriminatory employers from public exposure and limit effective
appellate review of arbitral awards. See id. at 31-32. The Court responded that NASD
decisions, which include the names of parties, summary of issues and description of the
award, are provided and made public. See Id. Also, the Court indicated that many ADEA
claims are not covered by arbitration agreements, so future precedent development will not be
halted. See id. at 32.
107 See id. at 30-31.
108 See id. at 30.
109 See id. at 30-31.
110 See id. at 31.
111 See id. at 31. The Court noted that a party is allowed to present its views in
arbitration and merely "trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for
the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." Id. (citation omitted).
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review of arbitral awards.1 12 The Court responded that NASD decisions,
which include the names of parties, summary of issues and description of
the award, are provided and made public.113 Any acceptable arbitration
process must then provide this minimum information in order to achieve the
standards set out in Gilmer.
The process issues raised in Gilmer are picked up in Patterson v. 12T
Consumer Financial Corp.,114 in which a court struck down an arbitration
clause, primarily because of a confusing set of arbitration procedures and
obstacles to a participatory hearing.11 5 In this case, unsophisticated
borrowers seeking "guaranteed loans" signed financing documents that were
contracts of adhesion that included an arbitration clause as the final
paragraph.11 6 The court determined that the contract was oppressive and
resulted in unfair surprise on the weaker parties based largely upon
irregularities in the administering agency's own arbitration procedures. 117
Initially, the location of the arbitration was unclear from both the
financing documents and the agency's procedures. On its face, there was
confusion about whether the arbitration would be held where the parties
signed the documents (California) or where the administering agency, the
National Arbitration Forum (NAF), was located (Minnesota). At execution
of the documents, even the administering agency could not inform
borrowers about the location of the arbitration until after a claim was
filed.118
112 See id. at 31-32. Gilmer also argued that the lack of written awards would stifle the
development of ADEA precedent. See id. However, the Court indicated that many ADEA
claims are not covered by arbitration agreements, so future precedent development will not be
halted. See id. at 32.
113 See id. at 31-32.
114 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
115 See id. at 566.
116 See id. at 565-566. As in Bell, Mastrobuono, Prudential and Broemmer, the
borrowers in Patterson were not sophisticated business people. See id. Unlike this earlier
precedent, the court also noted that the provisions were clearly written and highlighted in bold
letters. See Id.
117 See id. at 566-567. Some confusion about the arbitral procedures also arose from
the failure to provide a copy of the administering agency's manual to the borrowers. See Id. at
567. Parties were only provided the rules after 1TF had filed a claim against borrowers. See
Id. Similar to Prudential and Broemmer, the provisions had not been pointed out to the
parties, and the parties indicated that they did not recall reading the provisions. See Id. at 567.
11 See Id. at 566-567. In addition, parties seeking to challenge any claim had to notify
the administering agency which would automatically confer jurisdiction on NAP in Minnesota,
an inconvenient forum for California borrowers. See id. at 566.
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More importantly, opportunities for a participatory hearing were
severely limited in several ways. The arbitration was free only if parties
submitted written documents for NAF's review and award. Borrowers
would have to prepay substantial fees in order to gain an opportunity to
initiate a participatory hearing. Also, borrowers would have to pay added
fees for discovery, written findings and expedited hearings. The procedures
for borrowers requesting a fee waiver based on indigency were
"incomprehensible." The court determined that the contract was oppressive
because these procedures worked in reality to deny unsophisticated
borrowers any opportunity for a real chance to present their side of the
case.
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The likely effect of these procedures is to deny a borrower against
whom a claim has been brought any opportunity to a hearing, much
less a hearing held where the contract was signed, unless the
borrower has considerable legal expertise or the money to hire a
lawyer and/or prepay substantial hearing fees. The latter is especially
unlikely given the small dollar amounts at issue. In a dispute over a
loan of $2,000 it would scarcely make sense to spend a minimum of
$850 just to obtain a participatory hearing. In short, the procedure
seems designed to discourage borrowers from responding at all.
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Arbitration clauses that provide for arbitral procedures that fail to meet
or discourage basic procedural due process rights may be questioned based
upon the Gilmer and Patterson decisions.
Another issue of fundamental fairness in the arbitral process is the
rising concern about the quality and diversity of arbitral panels. Some cases
have also begun to discuss the lack of diversity of arbitral panels and its
impact on the effective assessment of statutory discrimination claims. The
opening salvo in this area involved a 1994 Government Accounting Office
(GAO) report on securities arbitration. In that report, the GAO criticized
NASD arbitral panels for their lack of experience and training in handling
statutory discrimination claims, which are different from typical NASD
cases that focus more on specific industry practices. The GAO report also
stated that NASD panels lacked the diversity integral to assess fairly
statutory discrimination claims. The study found that of those arbitrators
eligible to'consider discrimination claims, ninety-seven percent were white
and eighty-nine percent were white males over the age of sixty.121
119 See id.
120 rd.
12 1 See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
HOW REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES, GAO/HEH-94-
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The Prudential court picked up on these concerns in their decision to
reject arbitration of rape and sexual abuse and harassment claims. The court
expressed its concern that the serious charges levied by the two immigrant
women would be brought before an NASD panel lacking diversity. The
court noted that "in an area as personal and emotionally charged as sexual
harassment and discrimination, the procedural right to a hearing before a
jury of one's peers, rather than a panel of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, may be especially important." 122
In a second case, Olson v. American Arbitration Association,123 a
former NCR employee challenged an attempt to compel arbitration on
similar grounds under a state's deceptive trade practices law.124 The
employee charged that the American Arbitration Association (AAA) had
misrepresented its arbitral panels as impartial, contending that AAA panels
were biased in favor of employers, in part, because the AAA received
significant fees and contributions from employers. In addition, she argued
that the panels were overwhelmingly white, male and lawyers rather than a
cross-section of the public.12- In this instance, the court dismissed the
claims, stating that Olson's charges were merely speculative and did not
support a showing of bias. 126 However, the court's decision leaves open the
opportunity for a legal challenge in which the party questioning the use of
arbitration might provide statistics or other evidence to support their
assertions.
Although neither the Prudential or Olson cases have found panel
diversity to be dispositive, the issue should be considered regarding the
fairness of the arbitration process in statutory discrimination disputes.
17, at 8 (1994), cited in RUDER REPORT, supra note 24, at 116-117. See Lipton, supra note
3, at 32-33.
122 Prdendal, 42 F.3d at 1305 n.4.
123 876 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Tex. 1995). Olson initially brought an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the Texas state courts against her former employer NCR and
certain individual defendants. Those defendants brought a motion to compel arbitration under
the terms of a written employment agreement with Olson. The trial court granted the motion
and an arbitration hearing date was set. Before the arbitration hearing, Olson filed her
complaint in federal court against the AAA on her own behalf as well as those similarly
situated. See id. at 850-851.
12 4 See id. at 851.
125 See id.
126 See id. at 852. The court noted that even if Olson's claims were true, they did not
show bias as a matter of law. The court added that Olson's assertions were "stereotypical
characteristics" and not clear evidence of an individual panel's bias. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the arbitrability of statutory claims is clearly recognized, the
limits on the use of pre-dispute arbitration provisions are not yet firmly
established. The recent court decisions discussed in this article provide some
early indicators of appropriate limits on the use of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in employment and commercial disputes. Clearly, courts may
consider the factual circumstances of a waiver of the judicial forum,
examining the clarity of the provision, the business experience of the
weaker party and any signs of coercion, fraud or deceit. Also, the court may
consider whether the clause tries to thwart constitutional or statutory rights
through limits on legal or equitable remedies and procedural protections.
Furthermore, issues of arbitrator quality and diversity could provide
additional factors in a court's refusal to compel arbitration.
As more employment arbitration clauses are challenged in court, issues
of fairness in the waiver and arbitration process certainly need to be
addressed in the employment field in order to retain public respect and trust
in employment arbitration proceedings. Already, a number of
governmental, legal and human resources organizations have made a flurry
of recommendations to improve the fairness in employment arbitral
proceedings, including better arbitrator training, increased subject matter
knowledge and greater panel diversity in handling statutory discrimination
claims.
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Although the case law is still developing, employers can take certain
steps now to reduce legal challenges and employee mistrust of the
arbitration process. 128 Some basic steps that can help promote fairness in
employment arbitration include the following:
1. Clearly Identify to Employees the Rights Being Waived and the
Disputes Being Covered. As some recent decisions show, courts may strike
down all or part of ambiguous provisions that seem to prevent a clear,
127See Bencivenga, supra note 7 (Society for Human Resource Management
recommendations); McGowan, supra note 7 (Dunlop Commission recommendations); RUDER
REPORT, supra note 24 (NASD Task Force recommendations); Christopher A. Barreca ct al.,
Prototype Agreement on Job Bias Dispute Resolution, ABA Task Force on Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Employment, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at d34 (May II, 1995); EEOC:
Statement of Principles of Commission's Policy on ADR, 22 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) at 1734
(July 24, 1995) (EEOC Recommendations).
128 See supra note 127. See also Bales & Burch, supra note 2, at 634-635; Eastman &
Rothenstein, supra note 4, at 595; Lipton, supra note 3, at 32-33.
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voluntary waiver of access to the courts. Employers seeking to use pre-
dispute arbitration clauses should use specific language that clearly
describes the rights being waived and the types of disputes subject to
arbitration. Highlighting the clause in employment documents or using a
separate sign-off sheet for an arbitration clause and process will further help
to avoid claims based on lack of knowledge or coercion. Employees should
be given an opportunity to review the arbitration clause, including any
explanatory documents, before signing the agreement.
2. Educate Employees About the Arbitration Process. The cases also
suggest that the courts may consider the business acumen of the weaker
party in determining the validity of arbitration clauses. To help level the
playing field, employers should take the time to educate their employees
about the benefits and limitations of arbitration. The arbitration process can
be discussed in employee training seminars and orientations. In addition,
such training exercises may allow opportunities for employee input in
shaping company ADR procedures. The more employees are aware of the
benefits of arbitration and other forms of ADR, the less likely they are to be
suspicious of the process or to challenge its validity. Company managers
should be also properly trained about the arbitration process to avoid
employee confusion and future lawsuits based on misrepresentations, fraud
or coercion.
3. Avoid Limiting Substantive and Procedural Rights. As Gilmer
suggested, parties are merely exchanging the forum for resolution, not the
scope of substantive rights. Some employers have erroneously viewed
arbitration as a mechanism to evade statutory requirements such as equitable
relief, attorneys' fees, and punitive damages or constitutional mandates for
procedural due process. In creating an arbitration program, the employer
should allow the arbitrator the same statutory, equitable and legal remedies
that a judge or jury would have in litigation. The employer also should not
shorten the time period for filing a claim found in the relevant statute nor
limit the standard grounds for appealing arbitral awards. Further, in an
effort to promote a fair process, arbitration procedures should include
reasonable discovery, a meaningful opportunity to present one's case,
shared costs for the arbitral process, attorney representation of employees
and written awards.
4. Utilize Qualified, Diverse Arbitral Panels. Despite the split in court
views, any fair process should focus on the quality and diversity of the
arbitral panel. Companies should work with administering organizations to
convene diverse arbitral panels whose members have extensive subject
matter knowledge specific to the dispute. To help bolster employee
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confidence in the panel, company programs should allow employees to
participate in the review and selection of the arbitrators or administering
organization. Reasonable opportunities to challenge arbitrators should be
allowed with a certain number of preemptory challenges and unlimited
challenges for cause.
